Australia’s leading media outlets have produced different iterations of this narrative, including Nine newspapers’ ‘Red Alert’ series in 2023, which predicted a war with China within three years (hopefully we’ll survive 2026). The articles were widely criticised by experts, who described them as “hyperbolic” and “irresponsible”. Former Prime Minister, Paul Keating, was particularly scathing, describing the “extent of the bias and news abuse…unparalleled in modern Australian journalism”. Four Corners’ ‘Trading Fire’ can now be added to Australian media’s growing pile of panic pieces over China’s threat.

The ‘China Threat’ narrative follows some well-trodden beats:

1. China poses an existential threat to Australia due to the combination of its ever-expanding military, hegemonic ambitions in the Asia-Pacific, and expansive network of spies, where any Chinese resident could potentially be an agent of the Chinese Communist Party.

2. Australia is unprepared for this undeniable threat from China and must invest heavily in its armed forces and further integrate with the US military – our closest and most important ally.

3. New technologies, and the resources linked to these technologies (such as rare earth minerals) pose a new battlefront in this grand rivalry.

4. Australia’s extensive economic ties to China, along with its deepening military relationship with the US, place Australia in a contradictory and complicated situation.   

5. The drums of war are only getting louder as the threat from China is only escalating.

The Four Corners’ episode, ‘Trading Fire’ continues this narrative by investigating the export of rare earth minerals to China where they will be put to use in the manufacture of weapons, including nuclear arms, or as the lead reporter, Angus Griggs, notes: “if hostilities go nuclear, Australian minerals will have once again played a part”.

One of the episode’s central arguments is that Australia should seriously consider limiting or even ending the export of the critical mineral zirconium to China, on the basis that it could be used for nuclear arms manufacturing. Now, this is not on ethical grounds, as the export to the United States (which uses zirconium in similar industries – including nuclear arms) was lauded at the beginning of the episode. The argument also lacks coherence and a reasonable understanding of trade. Zirconium has a multitude of applications unrelated to weapons, including ceramics, dental implants, mobile phones, jewellery and nuclear fuel rods for China’s numerous power plants. Suggesting a ban on zirconium exports is akin to advocating for the end of iron ore exports to China as it could eventually be used to manufacture military tanks and ammunition – despite iron/steel being used in thousands of other applications unrelated to weapons manufacturing. 

Griggs later speculates that “If the US ever goes to war with China, Australia will have little choice but to support our longtime ally.” Setting aside the sweeping assumption that Australia has ‘little choice’, it begs the question: What hostilities and what war are we postulating?

Griggs and the vast majority of the commentators appearing in this episode seem to think that we are hurtling towards a war with China – we just better be prepared. Historically, wars are preceded by intractable grievances, a plummeting in relations, and/or mounting geopolitical tensions where either the rival parties cannot resolve these points of contention or a singular party chooses to act unilaterally out of self-interest. But in this case, what exactly could be leading us to war?

The Prospects of War – Separating Fact from Fear

Currently, there is no evidence that a war is brewing between the US and China. If we first focus on China, as Four Corners did, we can see that indeed a significant military build-up has taken place and has accelerated in the last ten years. According to the Centre for Strategic & International Studies, China’s defence spending has reached between USD $247 billion to over USD $400 billion, China holds more naval vessels than the United States (by the end of 2025, they are projected to have 395 ships, whereas the US fleet has plateaued at just below 300). China is on track to build a stockpile of 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030 and to reach 1,500 by 2035, and China has indeed diversified its nuclear capabilities by reaching the “triad” of nuclear delivery systems in land (intercontinental ballistic missiles), sea (submarine based intercontinental ballistic missiles), and air (strategic bombers capable of carrying air-launched cruise missiles). China’s military capabilities were carefully unpacked by Griggs and ANU’s Jennifer Parker in an empty cinema as they watched China’s Victory Parade from earlier this year.

Griggs, Parker and many of the other guests on this episode see this growing military capability as legitimating their concerns. However, if we contextualise China’s military capabilities by considering the following two factors, the ‘China Threat’ narrative unravels rather quickly:

• First, when we compare these figures to the United States, we can see that China continues to be dwarfed in almost every measure. The US spends USD $968.4 billion on defence, which is between two to three times greater than its Chinese counterpart. The United States holds over 5,000 nuclear warheads with five allied states in Europe (Italy, Germany, Belgium, Türkiye, and the Netherlands) hosting US nuclear weapons. And unlike China, the US enjoys a global network of military bases and allied ports that allows for force projection into any part of the world with an infrastructure that allows for ongoing redeployment of personnel, arms, transportation and armoured fighting vehicles.

• Secondly, the US enjoys powerful and well-established military alliances with multiple state actors, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). A number of these alliances hold clauses that commit all parties to defend each other if attacked by an external party. This includes the well-known Article 5 in NATO, the 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty with the Philippines, and defence pacts with Japan and South Korea.

Under these circumstances, no rational state actor would deliberately provoke a conventional war with the United States or its allies. This raises an important question: rather than preparing to attack, could China’s military posture be primarily aimed at defence and deterrence – a point that seems to have been overlooked by Griggs and his team? Even in geopolitical areas of contention, most notably Taiwan, China maintains a position of deterrence through its A2/AD system, and is well-aware of the mutually destructive consequences that a conflict would engender (this aspect was covered recently by the AustChina Institute article, “Between Rhetoric and Reality: Navigating the Taiwan Strait Crisis”).

If China were planning a future conflict with the US or its allies, it would be looking to build a rival military network of bases and alliances. However, no such bases or formal alliances have materialised in the last ten years. Similarly, China would be looking to disengage economically from the United States to avoid future chokepoints in a potential conflict. Instead, the Trump administration recently announced reductions in tariffs and retaliatory trade sanctions. The drums of war are not so loud if no one is beating them.

Lastly, if China were such an aggressor, we would expect it to leverage its nuclear arsenal to threaten the security of other states – much like Russia has done in the Ukraine war, or how the United States threatened China with a nuclear attack in 1953 during the last days of the Korean War. Instead, China has a ‘no first-use policy’ where nuclear arms are seen as a means of self-defence, and not aggression. Unlike the US, Russia and North Korea, China has not recently threatened the use of such nuclear arms against rival actors.     

Defensive Posture as Opposed to Aggression

Not only is China’s military expenditure much less compared to its US counterpart, it is also more commensurate with the size of its economy. China allocates 1.9% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to military spending, which is lower than both the US figure of 3.4% and the global average of 2.4%.

Historically, a state’s projection of military power has served its economic interests and expansion. China is the world’s second-largest economy, which remains export-oriented and focused on controlling crucial global supply chains. History – especially during the eras of United States and British dominance – has taught China that a strong military presence is needed to protect and maintain key trade routes and deter foreign influence. The “Century of Humiliation”, which witnessed foreign interventions that imposed neo-colonial wealth extraction and occupation on Chinese land, represents a clear reminder of the need to protect Chinese economic interests against foreign influence.

Even without the historical context, the pattern of military power being matched by a robust economy is evident worldwide. Most of the countries ranked among the largest economies by the IMF also appear among the strongest militaries in the Global Firepower Index (not in the same order, although the United States and China are first and second respectively). China is not posing an existential threat; it is simply following a trajectory typical of a state with a significant outward-facing economy.

Selective Hearing

Fundamentally, the Four Corners episode broke a cardinal rule in journalism – impartiality. Their selection of experts and interviewees shared a common position that China poses a threat to Australia, and that the alliance with the United States is inherently good. For instance, Australia National University’s Jennifer Parker has been an outspoken critic of China and has previously argued that China poses a threat to our “peaceful world order” and that “Australia must prepare for the possibility of crisis or conflict…if deterrence fails, we must be ready to respond”.

Australian academia contains a significant collection of security experts who could have presented counterviews to these perspectives and thereby provide a more balanced view for the ABC audience.

Four Corners would have been well served by Professor Clinton Fernandes, a former intelligence officer with the Australian Army, and co-founder of the Indo-Pacific Studies program at the University of New South Wales, whose recent book Turbulence: Australian Foreign Policy in the Trump Era provides insight into China, especially in relation to its nuclear buildup and maritime activities, where he has argued that China is taking a defensive position and faces significant naval limitations due to the anti-submarine forces of the US and its allies, including Australia.

Albert Palazzo, the former Director of War Studies for the Australian Army, would have also provided important context in that he questions how the Australian government has approached the threat of China, and instead argues that Australia should adopt the military philosophy of the “Strategic Defensive” which avoids direct confrontation. Furthermore, Palazzo questions both the legitimacy of China as an immediate threat and the viability of Australia’s “sub-imperial” status to the United States. Instead, he argues that we should reassess our relationship with the US and that climate change is a more pressing concern.

Such contributions would have led to a meaningful, robust discourse, as opposed to an episode tainted by tunnel vision.

The Need for Meaningful Debate

Episodes like Four Corners’ ‘Trading Fire’ contribute to a dangerous discourse that adversely shapes the public perception of China. Having the ‘China Threat’ narrative as the default position of Australia’s leading media outlets, political elites, and security commentators, manufactures a false perception that a conflict with China is inevitable, and the only thing to do is prepare and double-down on our ties with the US. This tunnel vision not only distorts public understanding, but also pressures policymakers toward militarisation rather than diplomacy.

There are scholars and commentators who question such a narrative using empirical evidence and historically-informed insights. Seeing China primarily as a threat is not just misleading, but it also limits how we perceive a path beyond great power rivalry. A more balanced approach would serve the national interest far better than sensationalist narratives. The ABC, as a public broadcaster, has a responsibility to foster informed debate, rather than amplify fear. Australia’s future security depends on dialogue, nuance, and a willingness to look beyond great-power rivalry.