Global Recognition and the One China Debate
Recognition of Taiwan has been a point of contention since
the 1970s. Research
from the Lowy Institute, published at the beginning of this year, found that 142
countries support Beijing’s position that Taiwan is part of China, with 119 of
these countries adopting the One China Principle, which asserts that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the PRC. Conversely, 40 countries,
including Australia and the US, support the One China Policy, which is a non-committal stance on Taiwan, acknowledging the PRC’s position that Taiwan is
a province of China but stops short of endorsing it. Such acknowledgement leaves it up to the PRC and the ROC
to work out what will happen with Taiwan in the future, and provides the
possibility for different forms of support and engagement with Taiwan.
The United Nations’ interpretation of One China Principle has
been subject to recent debate, with scholars Jacques
deLisle and Bonnie S. Glaser outlining how Resolution 2758 and subsequent
UN communiques have been misrepresented to appear that the UN supports One
China Principle rather than simply acknowledging the PRC as the “only lawful
representatives of China to the United Nations”.
One China and ‘Strategic Ambiguity’
The US has maintained a position of ‘strategic ambiguity’
where successive administrations have not confirmed or denied if the US
would defend Taiwan in an invasion scenario but have consistently provided arms
to Taiwan to support their self-defence capabilities. The Mutual Defense Treaty
was terminated in 1979 as part of the formal recognition of PRC as the sole
representative of China. The Taiwan
Relations Act (1979) then established the framework for the unofficial
relationship between the US and Taiwan, which provided various forms of
support, including the provision of military support to help Taiwan maintain
its self-defence capabilities. This strategic ambiguity together with the
ongoing provision of arms has acted as an effective deterrent to a possible
invasion.
The 1992 Consensus: A Fragile Framework
Over the years, relations between Communist-controlled
mainland China and Nationalist-controlled Taiwan were stabilised through the 1992
Consensus, which recognised the concept of ‘One China’ – an agreement allowing
for two distinct interpretations over governance. Essentially, both sides agreed
that Taiwan and mainland China were part of a singular China, but each
maintained its interpretation over who is the legitimate government of China. In
practice, the 1992 Consensus served as a framework for managing relations
between the two rival governments. Since then, trade, travel and relations
between the two improved significantly, with China eventually becoming Taiwan’s
largest trading partner.
Such strategic ambiguity and the agreed framework of the
1992 Consensus maintained a stable status quo between Taiwan and mainland China
for years. More recently, however, relations between the Taiwan and mainland
China have reached historic lows. This is largely a product of the simultaneous
rise of Chinese nationalism driven by the leadership of Xi Jinping and the
growing popularity of the independence movement in Taiwan, leading to historic election
victories for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the current ruling party in
a minority government.
Rhetoric only Heightens Tensions
Xi has been unambiguous on his determination to return Taiwan
to China, within the tenure of his presidency. As he noted in his New
Year’s Eve address in 2024, "The people on both sides of the Taiwan
Strait are one family. No one can sever our family bonds, and no one can stop
the historical trend of national reunification." Such rhetoric heightens
concerns of a potential future invasion.
These concerns are compounded by an increased Chinese presence
in the Taiwan Strait, including their own military
drills. The latest, held in April and titled ‘Strait Thunder 2025a’ that involved
135 aircraft, a two-side naval blockade and missile strikes on simulated Taiwanese
infrastructure.
According to the Chinese military, the drills acted as a “powerful
deterrent” to separatist elements in Taiwan. From Xi and the PRC’s
perspective, Taiwan’s return is part of the Chinese Dream, the mutually
beneficial rise of China that Taiwan should share in.
Conversely, the Taiwanese president, Lai Ching-te, has dialled
up his rhetoric against the PRC in March 2025, declaring
it to be “foreign hostile force” and suggesting the establishment of military
courts to prosecute sedition and the leaking of government secrets. Lai’s characterisation
of the PRC as ‘foreign hostile force’ invokes specific language from the 2020 Anti-Infiltration
Act, which defines such entities as those that are “at war with or are
engaged in a military standoff with the Republic of China”.
The suggestion of military courts alludes to the growing
concern over China’s influence in domestic Taiwanese affairs, or as Lai argues,
“China has been taking advantage of democratic Taiwan’s freedom, diversity, and
openness to recruit gangs, the media, commentators, political parties, and even
active-duty and retired members of the armed forces and police to carry out
actions to divide, destroy, and subvert us from within.”
Such language has been toned down of late, when Lai stated
in May, “Taiwan is happy to have exchanges and cooperation with China as long
as there is reciprocal dignity.” This is in large part due to Lai’s declining
popularity and the public’s general concern about escalating tensions
between Taiwan and mainland China. Yet the latest Han Kuang drillsindicate
that Lai and his government continue to hold China as a future aggressor.
Such stances are compounded by the United States, with the
Trump administration vocalising concerns about a potential Chinese invasion. In July, the current
US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, outlined the administration’s
position, "I can't speak for the Trump presidency, but I don't have
any worries about the U.S. being supportive of Taiwan and doing everything we
can to discourage the Chinese from invading."
US Involvement and Military Support for Taiwan
Ongoing US support includes
USD $28bn in Foreign Military Sales (FSM) between 2015 – 2025, expansion of
training in both the United States and Taiwan, arms transfers through the
Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (TERA) and the Taiwan Security Cooperation
Initiative (TSCI), which will provide over USD $1bn to ensure Taiwan’s “sufficient
self-defence capabilities”.
More recently, the US announced that 500
Taiwanese military personnel participated in a US-led military drill,
Northern Strike, in the state of Michigan where the Taiwanese joined eight
other partner countries alongside the US military. The drills were based on an
Indo-Pacific security crisis. Combined with the public admission of Taiwan’s
involvement, the US is clearly signalling to China its intent to be an ongoing
military presence in the region.
Rubio has encouraged the military escalation of Taiwan’s war
readiness as a means of deterring China, stating, "In
essence, it has to cost more than what it's worth". Such logic only
encourages military tensions rather than deescalating them. Other actors,
especially from senior government officials and think tank security experts,
have compounded this rhetoric by amplifying the perceived likelihood of
invasion and war.
The Geostrategic Reality that Many Ignore
Despite the rhetoric of the possibility of war, the reality
of what such an outcome would entail has not been given its proper due.
Commentators, many scholars and key government officials have chosen to ignore
the geostrategic reality of the Taiwan Strait in relation to both the military
build-up of China and the military leverage the US holds over China.
First, let’s look at China’s military bolstering. China’s Anti-Access/Area-Denial
(A2/AD) system extends across the East China Sea, the South China Sea and
the Taiwan Strait, significantly reducing the intervention and deterrence
capabilities of the US and its allies in this region, specifically the First
Island Chain (Kuril Islands, the Japanese archipelago, the Ryukyu Islands,
Taiwan, the northern Philippines and Borneo). This system is made up of
land-based, sea-based and aerial defence systems that include the following
arms: Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs),
Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM), Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM), a large fleet
of submarines, surface ships, fighter jets and bombers. Along the Taiwan
Strait, the PLA has established a series of military installations along the
mainland coast that can sink any ship that comes within range along with
anti-aircraft missile systems.
The United States is well aware of China’s strategic
advantage, especially in the Taiwan Strait. According to former Australian
Prime Minister, Kevin
Rudd, “desktop military war games conducted by Washington, Beijing and
Tokyo across a range of Taiwan scenarios, the United States has reportedly lost
repeatedly (according to some reports, this includes as many as nineteen
successive occasions – and, in some cases, even when fighting with a range of
its strongest regional allies).”
Rudd is not alone in this assessment. Harvard University
professor and former Assistant Secretary of Defense in Policy and Planning,
Graham T. Allison, has noted
that “China has been steadily pushing the US Navy out of its adjacent seas.
American ships continue to show their flags, conducting occasional
freedom-of-navigation patrols into the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea. The
US has also signalled that, in case of war, its carriers would remain behind
the First Island Chain – putting them beyond the reach of Chinese land-based missiles.
From that distance carrier-based aircraft would be unable to reach targets on
the Chinese mainland. Thus, the US Navy has been struggling to find a way these
aircraft-carriers and their plans can remain relevant.”
From the other side of the political spectrum, international
relations scholars Van Jackson and Michael Brenes have argued
that the Taiwan Strait represents a ‘security dilemma’, as the only means by
which the United States and its allies could penetrate the A2/AD defence system
would be through an aerial assault on the missile systems installed on the
Chinese mainland – an unwanted and unwarranted escalation that has a high
probability of a much wider war.
However, China is not in an absolute dominant position
either. As Jackson and Brenes rightly argue, the United States’ vast military
and already established presence in Taiwan mean that “China is inhibited –
deterred – from launching an invasion of Taiwan because it would be costly in
even the best case.” Indeed, any kind of military incursion by China would be
costly for China, Taiwan and the US, if an intervention took place. Such a
scenario could inevitably draw in other state actors. For instance, Australia
has a long history of militarily supporting the United States, while China would
likely receive support from North Korea.
War Games and the Cost of Conflict
The Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
released a new
report in July, on the possible outcomes of a conflict in Taiwan based on 26
war games. The scenario was based on escalating tensions where China imposed a
naval blockade, exploiting Taiwan’s dependency on energy imports and
international trade. The overall conclusions of the report were that:
Almost all scenarios incurred heavy losses for involved parties in
both human life and military resources.
Blockades are inherently escalatory.
Taiwan could not defend itself alone against the military
dominance of China and would require US military intervention (beyond the
supply of arms).
Consequently, the military dimension in Taiwan indicates
that a potential conflict would be an unwelcomed scenario due to the potential
for significant losses and rapid escalation. Military planners from the US,
Taiwan and China are aware of this security dilemma yet nationalistic rhetoric,
military drills and arms transfers are moving the needle in the wrong
direction.
Public Opinion in China: Divided on Taiwan
The Chinese public is divided on the prospect of militarily
resolving the issue of Taiwan. Research
by Nick Zeller, Renard Sexton, Michael Cerny and Yawei Liu from the Carter
Centre and Emory University found that just over half surveyed (55.1%) were
against any use of force against Taiwan. While research
from Adam Y. Liu and Xiaojun Li found the opposite to be true, with 55% of
respondents supporting armed reunification. However, this research also noted
that around a third opposed military conflict, with the rest unsure. As such,
mainland China is divided on how to deal with Taiwan, and reports in the
Chinese media claiming that armed reunification is widely supported are misleading
to say the least.
Meanwhile, Lai’s rhetoric against the PRC has been a
contributing factor to his decline
in popularity. In general, the Taiwanese public do
not believe a conflict with China is imminent, despite the political
establishment thinking otherwise. Recent recall
elections have provided favourable results for opposition politicians,
meaning that the minority government of the Democratic Progressive Party will
need to continue to negotiate with their counterparts, and be more measured in
their rhetoric towards China.
The issue of Taiwan and mainland China remains a
complex entanglement. At this present juncture, the stabilisation of relations and the reaffirming of the 1992 Consensus would reduce tensions significantly. A return to such a position would de-escalate antagonisms without either side losing their public standing.
Australia’s Strategic Position and Diplomatic Pressure
The Trump administration has placed pressure
on the Australian and Japanese governments to provide public pre-commitments to
support the US in a hypothetical war over Taiwan. US Under-Secretary for
Defense Policy, Eldrige Colby, who is also leading the review of AUKUS, has reportedly
made such demands of Australia and Japan. Such a move would be
diplomatically disastrous and has rightly been rejected by both governments.
In Australia’s case, the continuation of strategic ambiguity
has bipartisan support, with Liberal senator and well-known China hawk, James
Paterson, stating that it “wouldn’t be appropriate” for Australia to take such a position,
especially considering that the US has continued with the policy of ‘strategic
ambiguity’. The Australian government appropriately has chosen to refrain from
such positions and to resist American pressure on Australian foreign policy. Prime
Minister Anthony Albanese reiterated Australia’s commitment to “peace
and security” in the region, emphasising to the US the importance
of diplomatic outcomes as the most constructive path forward.
As it currently stands, diplomatic relations and dialogues
that work towards stability will involve the Taiwanese president turning down
the dial on anti-Chinese rhetoric and the PRC treating Lai as a politician whom
they can work with rather than viewing him as a separatist agitator.
Concluding Thoughts
Escalating tensions between China and
Taiwan are a worrying trend, and evidence of the growing militarisation of the
region. The complicated history between Taiwan and China means that it is
increasingly difficult to navigate a resolution that would satisfy all involved
parties. The interventions of outside powers, like the United States, have only
increased the likelihood of future hostilities – even as they aim to deter
conflict.
The Australian government has the
potential to act as a stabilising middle power. The government’s reaffirmed
position of strategic ambiguity, combined with improved relations with China,
demonstrates a capacity to act independently as a responsible regional actor
promoting peace and stability.
The geostrategic reality of the Taiwan Strait for both the
US-backed Taiwan and China translates to a military stalemate that should
encourage all involved to enter diplomatic talks. Neither China nor Taiwan is
currently pursuing this option. Militarisation characterises the position of
the two opposing forces. Doubling down on military activities and arms will
bring greater insecurity not just for Taiwan and China, but for the wider region
too. This includes Australia.
Engagement with Taiwan and China has been a fine balancing
act for decades. As our current government attempts to take on a more nuanced
approach to regional security, many of us will be watching closely on how they
manage to navigate the complexities of Taiwan-Chinese relations. The Taiwan
Strait does not have to become the world’s next flashpoint. The question is
whether leaders will choose diplomacy over militarisation before rhetoric
hardens into reality.
