The Era of Rising Piracy and the Need for Australia–China Maritime Cooperation

Piracy and at-sea robberies in Asia have increased significantly in 2025. The first half of that year was particularly concerning, witnessing an 83% increase compared to 2024. A significant increase in policing and arrests, particularly from Indonesia, resulted in a slowing down of this trend, but incidents still ended the year 23% higher than 2024 overall (rising from 107 cases in 2024 compared to 132 in 2025).

From a technical, legal definition standpoint, out of the 132 incidents in 2025, the overwhelming majority of the attacks would be interpreted as armed robbery against ships (ARAS), compared to just two incidents of actual piracy. The difference comes down to territory, where piracy takes place in international waters, while ARAS happens within the territorial waters of a coastal state. Subsequently, many of these incidents are legally the responsibility of the state within whose jurisdiction the criminal act occurred.

Strait of Malacca: The World’s Most Critical Maritime Chokepoint

According to the multilateral organisation tasked with reporting and encouraging cooperation in dealing with piracy, ReCAAP (Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia), 108 incidents were recorded in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore in 2025, compared to only a handful of incidents in other areas, such as the South China Sea, which recorded just two incidents. This issue is further compounded by the overall lack of reporting of at-sea robberies and piracy – the number, in reality, is considered to be far higher.  

This is expected, as the Strait of Malacca is a maritime chokepoint for trade, where it has been reported that USD $3.5 trillion of trade moves through this stretch each year. This includes two-thirds of China’s total trade volume and all of China’s energy SLOC (sea lines of communication) - pathway through which energy is transported by sea from producer to consumer, representing 83% of China’s oil imports. It is unsurprising, then, that the geo-strategic challenge of the strait was dubbed “The Malacca Dilemma” by former-President of China, Hu Jintao.

Similarly, around two-thirds of Australia’s exports and 40% of its imports traverse the Malacca Strait and Indonesia’s archipelagic sea lanes. This includes our export of commodities such as coal and gas. Despite efforts to find alternative trade routes, both Australia and China remain highly exposed to disruptions in this narrow and economically significant maritime passage.

The issue is further compounded by the strait being a contested maritime space (with Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore holding overlapping claims). As such, these states remain highly sensitive to foreign intervention in these waters. Considering that the United States, China, and other middle-powers like Australia all have an interest in the Strait of Malacca, resistance to foreign activities is expected.

This was witnessed when the US proposed a cooperative venture, Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), led by the US Navy to combat criminal activity in the Malacca Strait in 2003. The proposal had an incredibly short lifespan, as it was abandoned by the end of 2004, after it was openly rejected by Malaysia and Indonesia. They did not want outside powers operating in their territorial waters.

ReCAAP as a Platform for Practical Cooperation

ReCAAP has been the more successful multilateral alternative to the RMSI, as it has focused on information-sharing and capacity-building. Australia and China are both members of ReCAAP and have provided capacity-building programs, mostly on policing and prosecution, to the relevant coastal states for anti-piracy measures.

ReCAAP holds 20 members, including 14 from Asia, 5 from Europe, and Australia. Indonesia and Malaysia remain non-members but participate in ReCAAP through a number of forums and through information sharing. The United States was previously a member, but withdrew from 66 multilateral organisations in January 2026, which included ReCAAP. This withdrawal aligns with the United States’ recent National Security Strategy (NSS), which reiterates a focus on dominating the Western Hemisphere and signals a declining interest in the Asia-Pacific.

Shifting Regional Dynamics After the US Withdrawal

Without the US providing the necessary maritime resources to address issues such as piracy, regional powers like Australia and China will need to step in to fill the gap. Failing to do so may lead to a further escalation in piracy and at‑sea robberies, with significant implications for the security of our import and export corridors.

At present, Australia and China regard each other as strategic competitors in the maritime domain. However, the rise in piracy presents a common threat to their mutual economic security. Collaborative efforts by Australia and China to support the littoral states of the Strait of Malacca – through joint training and information sharing (similar to that undertaken in 2012), the provision of equipment, or the economic aid needed to address the socio-economic pull of piracy – could prove to be a low-stakes approach to cooperation. These initiatives may even serve as the first small steps toward thawing the military tensions between the two.

Pathways for Limited but Meaningful Collaboration

Coastal states in the region have consistently resisted foreign naval interventions in their territorial waters, yet they do accept capacity building assistance and multilateral, non-intrusive forms of co-operation. This establishes a clearly defined boundary for the types of regional cooperation that states like Australia and China could pursue.

China attended an Australia-hosted four-day ReCAAP Capacity Building Executive Programme (CBEP) in Sydney in 2023 without much fanfare, indicating that low-level forms of joint participation in multilateral forums are indeed conceivable. The final part of ReCAAP’s mission is to build cooperative arrangements – suggesting that more tangible forms of collaboration to combat piracy could be achievable with active participation from both China and Australia. As Dr. Edward Chan of the Australia National University has noted: “By focusing on shared maritime interests, Australia can reinforce its role as a regional leader, foster cooperation with China, and build a more inclusive framework for ocean governance.”

Conclusion

The Council on Foreign Relations has noted that the United States’ Asian allies are reconsidering the reliability of the US in providing security and support on issues like piracy. Australia may have to do the same. Engaging with China on non-security maritime issues may indeed be the most prudent option and could present an opportunity to broaden avenues not previously considered.

Rising piracy in chokepoints such as the Straits of Malacca and Singapore expose the vulnerabilities of states that depend heavily upon maritime imports & exports. Despite China’s efforts to find alternative pathways, it remains constrained by the longstanding ‘Malacca Dilemma’ - a challenge that Australia also shares due to its reliance on the same corridor.

With the very real possibility of a reduced US presence in the Asia-Pacific, Australia may need to be more open to working within regional organisations where China is also a major actor, to address shared challenges such as piracy. Following the United States’ recent exit from ReCAAP, such an opportunity might emerge sooner than we think. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and his senior ministers have already demonstrated a capacity to build a more productive relationship with China while maintaining a close alliance with the US. Their next challenge will be navigating a constructive dialogue on maritime issues while bolstering Australia’s naval capabilities – let’s hope they are equal to the task.