The geopolitical tensions surrounding Chinese naval drills near Australia, the role of international law and exploring diplomatic solutions like a Code of Conduct to manage future maritime interactions
Security and Geopolitics
Published: 2nd June 2025
In February 2025, Chinese naval drills just outside Australia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) reignited debate over maritime security, international law and regional stability.
While the exercises did not breach the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), they raised concerns about transparency, military escalation and Australia’s strategic response
As naval activity intensifies across the Indo-Pacific, this article explores the legal frameworks governing such drills, the geopolitical context behind them and the potential for diplomatic tools—such as a Code of Conduct—to reduce tensions and promote stability between Australia and China
China’s naval activity close to Australia’s coast in February of this year, has raised concerns on the looming threat China poses in the sea. Notably, two live-fire drills were conducted by three Chinese naval ships in the Tasman Sea, roughly 340 nautical miles or 640 kilometres away from the Australian coast. Since the live-fire activity took place in ‘international waters’, China did not violate the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), yet it sparked much concern amongst the Australian public and media. Military drills in international waters are a common practice for navies worldwide, including Australia. With China’s growing naval presence, such operations are only expected to increase. There’s much to unpack on this issue.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or UNCLOS (1982) is an internationally agreed legal framework that outlines the rules for the use of the world's oceans. Fundamentally, it allows all states to enjoy the freedom of navigation, the capacity to fly above, scientific research and fishing in international waters. At its core, UNCLOS is based on the holistic concept that the oceans are to be shared and mutually respected. When it comes to coastal states, they enjoy sovereignty over their territorial waters (up to 12 nautical miles or 22 kilometres from its baseline). The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of coastal states extends as far as 200 nautical miles (roughly 370 kilometres) which gives coastal states sovereignty over natural resources (such as oil and gas extraction) and economic activities (such as fishing). Foreign vessels are permitted to pass through territorial waters, as long as it is deemed as “innocent passage”. In relation to an EEZ, all states enjoy the freedom of navigation and even the capacity to lay submarine cables and pipelines.
The military drills of February took place outside Australia’s EEZ, and therefore China was well within its rights to conduct such operations. Prime Minister Albanese’s response was measured – he acknowledged China’s legal right to conduct military operations in international waters whilst formally protesting the lack of advance notice. However, the rules regarding such notifications remain somewhat unclear. As the live-fire drill targets were low-altitude rather than surface-to-air, China asserts that it was not obligated to provide such notice. Historically, however, navies do provide notifications of such exercises as a matter of common courtesy.
Military drills in international waters is a common occurrence, and navies participate in them for varied reasons including surveillance, intelligence gathering, training, testing new technology, building military capacity and deepening security alliances or partnerships. Military drills can heighten tensions during times when states view each other as strategic rivals. Such activities may be interpreted as training exercises in preparation for a potential future conflict; therefore nearby military drills can be quite provocative.
The biennial, US-led Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) is the largest naval military exercise in the world. In 2024, RIMPAC hosted over 25,000 military personnel from 29 states, including Australia. The drills consist of various training exercises in and around Hawaiian Islands designed to enhance interoperability, where the scenarios and themes revolve around combating a large maritime power in the Asia-Pacific. China actually participated in RIMPAC exercises in 2014 and 2016 but were uninvited in 2018, not returning since. The U.S. ambassador to China was unequivocal about the United States’ rivalry with China: “Our two militaries are vying for military supremacy. Who’s going to be the most powerful in the most strategic part of the world, which is the Indo-Pacific?”
The militarisation and tensions in the South China Sea and in the Taiwan Straits have witnessed increased activity from both China and the US. The annual Balikatan (Filipino for ‘shoulder-to-shoulder’) is focused on bolstering preparedness and interoperability between the US and the Philippines based on their Mutual Defence Treaty (1951), which also includes participants from Australia and Japan. The US has provided advanced weapons-systems to the Philippines which includes the mid-range Typhon missile system which can be transported on amphibious vessels and strike targets on mainland China. The 2025 Balikatan exercises involved over 17,000 personnel and included war games near Taiwan and in disputed areas of the South China Sea.
Conversely, China has launched military exercises titled “Strait Thunder-2025A” around Taiwan this year, involving 21 warships, over 70 aircraft and four coastguard vessels. The drills involved coordinated war games around the central and southern parts of Taiwan, as well as in the East China Sea, that had simulated targets of key Taiwanese cities including Tainan, Hualien and Taichung – all holding military bases.
China also conducted military drills in the South China Sea as a direct countermeasure to the Philippines, especially in regard to the Scarborough Shoal, which lies within the EEZ of the Philippines and remains a contentious geopolitical zones. China claims the vast majority of the South China Sea, citing a historical presence dating back to the second century B.C. , delineated by China’s “nine-dash line” and defended through the artificial build-up and militarisation of islands, notably the Spratly Islands. In 2016 a ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration wholly denied China’s historical claim to the South China Sea and declared the Spratly Islands to be ‘rocks’ (legally not entitled to an EEZ). China rejected the ruling and has continued to militarise the islands as a means of defending its claim. Notably, China’s military drills in the South China Sea and Taiwan were conducted as a singular naval power, unlike their rivals.
Ultimately, these military drills and tensions in the Asia-Pacific region have resulted in the militarisation of the region and growing concerns over the potential for a future conflict. The US have deepened military ties with Asia-Pacific states, including Vietnam, despite their conflict-laden past, and the Philippines, a key strategic partner in the region. A visit to the Philippines by US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth in March reaffirmed the United States’ military commitment to the country, during which he warned of “threats from the Communist Chinese”.
Similarly, China has expanded its military presence, becoming more assertive in the region and strengthening partnerships where possible. Late last year, it was noted that China docked two warships at Cambodia’s Ream naval base, suggesting relations that are closer than previously believed. China has also conducted military drills in the Gulf of Tonkin, near Vietnam, projecting power and raising concerns. Throughout late 2024, China and Russia have undermined Japan’s sovereignty in the East China Sea through air and naval breaches. Consequently, it is unsurprising that military spending across Oceania and Asia increased by 6.3% in 2024, representing $629 billion.
China is undergoing significant military expansion to catch up with its nearest rival, the United States. From a naval standpoint, China’s Peoples’ Liberation Army Navy (PLA-N) is poised to soon surpass its Atlantic rival. China has the fastest-growing navy in the world and is projected to exceed the reach of the United States by 2035 – just ten years away. Retired Rear Admiral Michael A. McDevitt of the U.S. Navy has predicted that by 2035 China will have 430 ships, including 270 ‘blue water ships’ of various classes (ships capable of transoceanic travel). Indeed, China is growing increasingly confident and assertive in international waters as it builds up experience and intelligence within its naval forces.
All of this leads to the rather obvious conclusion that naval military drills are here to stay and have the real possibility of increasing in the near future. So, what options does Australia have?
One possible response is to seek a Code of Conduct (COC), a negotiated agreement outlining rules of behaviour in a designated area. A COC has been under negotiation for decades between claimants in the South China Sea through ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) and China. ASEAN and China have agreed to finalise a South China Sea COC by 2026 – though whether it materialises remains to be seen.
A COC between China and Australia in relation to Australia’s EEZ could include protocols such as pre-determined notifications and acceptable distance for training exercises. Such diplomacy would involve complexities and compromises that both sides might be reluctant to embrace. Furthermore, a COC is non-binding so only functions effectively if it is actively embraced and upheld by all parties. Despite this, a COC has much potential in stabilising and deepening relations. First, COCs help stabilise relations by clearly establishing norms and processes within a shared space. Second, COCs may create opportunities for deeper cooperation, including joint operations. For instance, the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, includes the possibility for cooperative activities such as joint scientific research projects, search and rescue operations, joint actions in addressing transnational crime and joint environmental protection efforts.
Another avenue could be a bilateral treaty that legally defines the rights and freedoms of both states. This could be negotiated between Australia and China and has the capacity to be mutually beneficial. It would also have the possibility for clear legal mechanisms as a means of enforcement.
Historically, such bilateral agreements have emerged between past rivals. For instance, the Vietnam-China Boundary Delimitation Agreement (2000) delineates maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Tonkin and clarified the boundaries of agreed economic activity. And in 1972, US-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas acted as agreed behaviours in the ocean – which included military drills – to avoid accidental clashes and military escalation between the two superpowers. This agreement did indeed make the oceans safer and more stable with some analysts suggesting an updated more expansive version could be beneficial today. Although these agreements differ from the historical or political context of Australia-China relations, they demonstrate that strategic rivals can forge agreements that stabilise relations and are mutually beneficial
If the frequency of naval drills intensifies, diplomatic solutions such as the those mentioned above will become increasingly appealing. Negotiating a mutually acceptable agreement will require significant diplomatic finesse from both parties. Furthermore, a COC is a rather neutral document, meaning it could be established without jeopardising or undermining the much-valued security alliance with the U.S. A code has the potential to not only stabilise relations on the high seas but could also be the first step towards de-escalating tensions in a region now characterised by growing militarisation.
Email: info@aci.org.au
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