Xi’s statement is in line with China’s positions on other
conflicts, notably the Ukraine
War, Sudan’s
civil war, and the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict. Considering China’s broad economic interests, its preference for
non-intervention and advocacy for stability, aligns with ensuring the free flow
of international trade and the preservation of economic partnerships. Even in
areas where it has been accused of aggression, such as the South China Sea,
Taiwan, and its border disputes with India, these tensions have not escalated into
direct military conflict. China has not engaged in a full-scale war since the 1979
Sino-Vietnamese War, launched in response to Vietnam’s continued occupation
of Cambodia.
China’s Emerging Global Image
The Iran War is increasingly emerging as an inflection point,
shaping how key global actors - especially across the Global South - perceive China
as the more stable and responsible of the two leading global powers. China’s
economic and diplomatic ties to an isolated Iran appear to have played a pivotal
role in encouraging Tehran toward a short-term cease-fire, while continuing
to support
diplomatic negotiations to end the conflict (despite reported simultaneous exports
of military-related materials to Iran). Consequently, China’s public stance,
economic interests, and diplomatic efforts seems to reinforce perceptions of
China as a more stable and responsible global actor that operates behind the
scenes to facilitate peace.
The recent
Xi-Trump summit, where Trump sought to persuade China to increase pressure
on Iran to accept the US terms for ending the conflict, did not bring about the
desired results, with China holding firm on its position. Nonetheless, the very
fact that such engagement took place underscores China’s central role in global
affairs and its growing importance as a key diplomatic interlocutor in efforts
to resolve major conflicts.
Australia’s Strategic and Reputational Risks
From an Australian perspective, the Iran War highlights a
number of concerning factors that the Albanese government will have to address.
When the US and Israel launched their attacks on Iran, Australia
was quick to support
the US actions on the premise that they were “acting to prevent Iran from
obtaining a nuclear weapon and to prevent Iran continuing to threaten
international peace and security”. From an international law standpoint,
however, launching air strikes to pre-empt a potential Iranian nuclear weapons
program raises significant legal concerns. Moreover, an increasingly clear
pattern is emerging in the US’s selective application of international law, most
notably in its approach to Venezuela
earlier this year, Yemen in early 2025, and now Iran. An open
letter signed by over 100 international law experts states that the US and
Israeli strikes against Iran constitute a “clear violation of the United
Nations Charter” and “raise serious concerns about violations of international
human rights law and international humanitarian law, including potential war
crimes”. Given Canberra’s public backing of these US-led actions, Australia’s
advocacy for the rules-based international order is called into question.
Australia’s support also stands in sharp contrast to that of
the Global South, where governments such as those of Pakistan, South Africa,
Brazil, and Turkey have criticised the attacks as violations of international
law and warned of their long-term destabilising effects in the region. Australia
also stands out in comparison to France, Germany and the UK, whose more
cautious joint
statement avoids explicit support of the US and instead calls for
de-escalation and a “negotiated solution”.
One of Australia’s leading international security experts,
Allan Behm, was especially disparaging
of Australia’s “startling” response, arguing that it “portrays us as
gullible, duplicitous or both”. Notably, the Albanese government was not
rewarded by its US counterparts for its public support. Instead, President
Trump has been quite vocal in criticising Australia’s lack of tangible military
support in the war on Iran and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. Albanese responded
that the US did not formally request such military support. Consequently,
Australia’s diplomatic reputation has taken a bit of a battering since the Iran
War, a concerning prospect as Australia seeks to adopt a more judicious
middle-power approach to international relations.
Economic Fallout and Domestic Implications
On the economic front, Australia, and much of the world,
have now experienced severe consequences from the war. Most dramatically, Iran’s
blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has resulted in a sharp rise in fuel prices, higher
inflation, and an increased likelihood of further
interest rate hikes. Oxford Economics has warned
that if the conflict becomes prolonged, Australia could “suffer a sharp
recession” – an outcome that we would all like to avoid.
Reassessing Australia’s Strategic Posture
In this context, many of Australia’s leading experts are
beginning to question whether it is time to reassess the country’s relationship
with the US. Sam Roggeveen of the Lowy Institute has recommended
as much, noting that the US’s closest allies are already working towards a
future in which the US is no longer the primary guarantor of their national
security. As Roggeveen notes, “Australia is beginning to look like an outlier
by substantially raising its stake in its US alliance through the AUKUS
initiative.”
Nick Bisley, Professor of International Relations
at La Trobe University, further adds an important point: the US is a declining
power, and Australia needs to accept this reality. As Bisley argues,
“Over the coming years, it will be a less dominant power on every conceivable
measure. From hard military power and cutting-edge technology to global output
and soft power, China (and others) are fast catching up.”
Joseph Camilleri, Emeritus Professor at La Trobe University,
is the most critical, suggesting
that the US relationship is not only highly problematic but that Australia’s
continued ties to the United States will mean irreparable harm to our
reputation on the international stage and, more importantly, our capacity to
respond to the most immediate and pressing challenges that face us today.
Indeed, Roggeveen, Bisley, and Camilleri raise important
considerations. Australia’s unconditional support for the United States has not
only exposed Australia’s strategic vulnerabilities but is undermining future
opportunities with other regional powers.
A Defining Test for Australian Foreign Policy
When considering how the Iran War has impacted Australia, it
should give the country pause to reflect on its relationship with both its long-time
ally, the US, and its regional neighbour, China, which continues to be treated
as a looming threat despite being Australia’s largest trading partner.
China’s diplomacy and focus on restoring stability to global
trade and regional security seems to have only amplified China’s standing as a
responsible global actor, in stark contrast to its American counterparts. With
the increasing likelihood of the US diverting military assets towards the core
interests of the Middle East and the Western Hemisphere, Australia may need to reconsider
how it perceives and engages with China. Many states, especially those in the
Indo-Pacific, have already come to such a realisation by applying hedging strategies
that allows them to navigate relations with both the US and China.
The Labor government has indicated a cautious détente with
China, yet remains deeply embedded in the US-alliance network. This is a
concerning prospect, as Australia’s continued stance could significantly affect
future diplomatic and trade relations with China and other states in the
Indo-Pacific region and beyond. Canberra’s bipartisan and steadfast commitment
to the US has the very real possibility of leaving Australia diplomatically
isolated in a region surrounded by Global South states, where the economic
centre of gravity is pulling towards Asia, and the diplomatic moral high-ground
is no longer projected from the Atlantic.
The Iran War may indeed finally trigger the much-needed national
conversation on the nature and depth of Australia’s relationship with its American
partner. Under such circumstances, Australia has an opportunity to pursue a
more independent middle path where foreign policy is forged through a lens
based on pragmatism that maintains constructive relationships with all major
partners. Regional states such as Singapore,
Vietnam,
and Indonesia
have already demonstrated the effectiveness of hedging strategies in navigating
great power competition. For Australia, the challenge is no longer whether to
adapt, but how quickly and decisively it can recalibrate its strategic posture.
Reassessing the depth and terms of Australia’s strategic alignment with the
United States should be the first step on that path.
